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"Much struck." 
That was Darwin's way of saying that something he observed 
fascinated him, arrested his attention, surprised or puzzled him. The 
words "much struck" riddle the pages of both his Voyage ofthe Beagle 
and his The Origin of Species, and their appearance should alert the 
reader that Darwin was saying something important. Most of the 
time, the reader can infer that something Darwin had observed was at 
variance with what he had expected, and that his fai th in some alleged 
law or general principle hadbeen shaken, and this happened repeat­
edly throughout his five year sojourn on the H.M.S. Beagle. The 
"irritation" of his doubting the theretofore necessary truths of natu­
ral history was Darwin's stimulus to inquiry, to creative and thor­
oughly original abductions. 
"The influence of Darwin upon philosophy resides in his ha ving 
conquered the phenomena of life for the principle of transi tion, and 
thereby freed the new logic for application to mind and morals and 
life" (Dewey p. 1). While it would be an odd fellow who would 
disagree with the claim of Dewey and others that the American 
pragmatist philosophers were to no small extent influenced by the 
Darwinian corpus,! few have been willing to make the case for 
Darwin's influence on the pragmatic philosophy of William James. 
Philip Wiener, in his well known work, reports that 
Thanks to Professor Perry's remarks in his definitive 
work on James, "the influence of Darwin was both 
early and profound, and its effects crop up in unex­
pected quarters." 
Perry is a senior at the University of Massachusetts at Dartmoltth. Hc will join the Cwtre 
Jor Philosophy, Technology and Society at the University of AberdcC1l, Scotland this jaIl, 
where he will commence reading Jor a1l M. Wt. in Philosophy. 
I There is no dearth of references for the impact of Darwin upon philosophy, 
American or otherwise. 
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But that being said, Wiener proceeds to "trace James' use of the 
Darwinianideaofevolutionin Uames'] magnum opus, ThePl'inciples 
ofPsychology," beyond which tomes Wiener felt no need to trespass 
(as is clearly evinced by Wiener's choice of sources and citations) 
(Wiener, p. 104). It is neither my intention to discuss why Wiener 
decided to confine his investigation of James' Darwinism to The 
Principles, nor whether Wiener was indeed justified in that decision. 
Yet while reading the collectionofJames' 1906-1907 Lowell Institute 
lectures (thereafter published as Pragmatism: A New Name for Some 
Old Ways afThinking) , Iwas "muchstruck" by their Darwinianfeel, by 
their Darwinian-sounding phrases, and by their general resonance 
with the theory ofevolution via descentwithmodification-"natural 
selection." Whatever Wiener's reason for forsaking Pragmatism­
and I suspect some over-reliance on the advice of R.B. Perry had 
something to do with it-it seems to me that he ought not have. 
Though Wiener's book is in many respects the seminal work on 
the relationship between Darwin and the founders of the American 
philosophical tradition known broadly as pragmatism, it is not the 
only work that treats of this subject, and Wiener is not alone in his 
virtual abandonment of Pragmatism in favor of other sources for 
insights to James' dalliance with Darwin. Cynthia Eagle Russett, in 
her Da1ilJin In America: The Intellectual Response 1865-1912, cites 
Pragmatism only once,2 and Peter J. Bowler neglects Pragmatism 
entirely. thereafter offering only the most pithy citations from James' 
Principles. And while Michael Ruse (in his stimulating Taking Darwin 
Seriously) was considerably more generous inhis treatment of James 
than either Russett or Bowler-Ruse actually cites Pragmatism in his 
bibliography-he, too, did not apparently find the Lowell Institute 
lectures as interesting a source for James' Darwinism as I have. 
The important question that this raises is: Are these authors 
justified in leaving Pragmatism out ojtheirpot'tt'ait of James as aDarwin­
influenced philosopher? And while this question is quite germane to 
my present agenda, I propose to answer itonly by way ofoffering my 
own celebration of what seems to me to be James' genuine evolution­
2 James: "To determine a thought's meaning, we need only consider what 
conduct it is fitted to produce." To her credit, she chose a passage which has a good 
Darwinian word in it, that is, "fitted." The means-end relationship here is consistent 
with my observations about James' Darwinian thinking, apropos adaptation, 
adaptive traits, &c. 
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ary epistemology.3 Should I succeed in convincing the reader that 
there is much Darwinian thought in James' Pragmatism, and more 
importantly, that James' remarks on common sense are best appre­
ciated when read from a Darwinian point of view, then I feel that I 
will have demonstrated that the above mentioned treatments of 
James are, on this head, deficient. 
Some perambulatory remarks are necessary: 
I believe that Darwinian evolution may be an invaluable way to 
frame what James had to say about, among other things, common 
sense. While Wiener has focused almostexc1usively onhow Darwin's 
work influenced James' physiological psychology-and I think 
Wiener implies: by that route, James' philosophy-I hope to show 
how James' thoughts on common sense can best be appreciated if one 
thinks about them in terms of Darwinian evolution. It is, of course, 
too easy to impose upon James evolutionary ideas which could 
scarcely be called outgrowths of James' reading of Origin (&c.); and 
to this extent these would not be, properly speaking. Darwinian in 
origin. I have been careful not to use (e.g.) post-evolutionary synthe­
sis ideas about molecular genetics to bring out the "evolutionism" in 
James' pragmatism-even when these ideas genuinely resonate 
with the spirit of Darwin's own evolutionary theories. 
Pragmatism has long been esteemed as one of the classics of this 
nation's indigenous philosophy. If our appreciation of Pragmatism is 
to survive, if the slim tome is not to become extinct from the shelves 
of college bookstores-or from syllabi-then we might wish to 
consider the advantages of adapting our reading of it-in spite of 
Wiener (et al.). 
I. Evolutionary Epistemology: What is it? 
The history of the use of the word' evolution' is itself interesting; 
and were it not question-begging I would begin by saying that the 
word has undergone considerable evolution before and since Dar­
3 Ruse rejects thatJ ames ever adieu Ie ted an "eval u Honary ep istemology." This, 
however, has as much to do withdisagreements about what precisely "evolutionary 
epistemology" is, as it does with (a) what James had to say about knowledge, ( b) 
whatJames had to say abou t evolution and Darwin and (c) whatJames meant when 
he said it! 
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win.4 For our purposes, we may define' evolution' simply as achange 
in form or behavior over time. To explain "evolutionary epistemology" 
is a somewhat easier task, thanks to the new Blackwell '5 Companion to 
Epistemology, which devotes three pages to the subject. Excerpts from 
the first two paragraphs (for our present purpose) do an admirable 
job of summing it up: 
This is an approach to the theory of knowledge that 
sees an important connection between the growth of 
knowledge and biological evolution. An evolution­
ary epistemolOgist claims that the development of 
human knowledge proceeds through some natural 
selection process, the best example of which is 
Darwin's theory of biological natural selection. The 
three major components of the model of natural selec­
tion are variation, selection and retention ... [T]hose 
variations that perform useful functions are selected, 
while those that do not are not selected ... In the 
modem theory of evolution, genetic mutations pro­
vide the (random, non-directed] variations ... the 
environment provides the filter of selection, and re­
production provides the retention ... Evolutionary 
epistemology applies this blind variation and selec­
ti ve retention model to the growth of scientific knowl­
edge and to thought processes in general (Blackwell, 
p.122). 
The "evolution" part is sometimes meant quite literally (d. Steven 
Toulmin), while others intend only that knowledge, knowledge 
acquisition, "belief fixing," obtain in an evolutionary sort of way: 
Beliefs vary. and these differing beliefs "compete" for limited 
attentional resources, for scarce cognitive space, for some functional 
role in our lives. Some of these beliefs, owing to their present fitness 
-Le.: their tried-and-true value in our lives-fare the struggle for 
survival better than other beliefs; these beliefs are the ones that are 
kept-and vvhich go on to support the production of other beliefs, 
which will ensemble prOVide the firmament for future abductions. 
4 Curiously, Darwin does not use the word "evolution" once in the first edition 
(1859) of Origin. The closest he comes is the cognate "evolved "-it is the last ward ill 
tlze book. 
39 THE ORIGIN OF AN INQUIRY 
Literal application of the theory of evolution to epistemic matters 
is fraught with difficulties: First, "knowledge" is lumped together 
with the set"all organic beings" and then the laws believed to obtain 
for the laUer are applied to the former. A less objectionable exploita­
tion of evolutionary principles (as described above) is as a model for 
how persons fix beliefs (or, for how beliefs seem to get fixed), since 
the principles of evolutionS are taken strictly heuristically. 
The claim, then, is that the value of our reading James' Pragma­
tism is enhanced if we understand it as an attempt to articulate a 
theory ofknowledge which is based inpart on the Darwinian model 
of evolution.6 I will endeavor to unearth for the reader key passages 
in the chapter on common sense which support my claim that James 
intended his audience at the Lowell Institute to be thinking about 
Darwinandhis principles of biological evolution. I am assuming that 
James accepted Darwinism, accepted the argument that species 
evolved from a single common ancestor, that he rejected creationism 
as well as Lamarckism (&c.) as alternative accounts of the origin of 
species. A good question to ask at the outset, then, is this: What sorts 
ofbeliefs about the world would someonewho accepted Darwinian evolution 
be likely to have? And one sort of answer is this: uniformitarianism and 
actualisltL. 
II. "Uniformitarianism" and "Actualism" 
Without going into great detail, it should be recalled that the way 
for Darwin's evolutionary model and mechanism was paved in part 
by the geologists of the earlier part of that century, who, challenging 
Usher's pronouncement that the world was created by God in the 
year 4004 B.C., attempted: 
(1) to establish that the age of the earthwasmuchgreater than 
5 While there is much agreement within the field. evolutionary biologists (to 
include molecular geneticists working on evolutionary problems). there is still 
much disElgreement about (e.g.. ) whether natural selection oc neutral drift is the 
leading cause ofevaluHon. how species ought to be qualified. &c. Itwould be wrong 
to believe tha t there is one and only one" evol u tionary theory." I am gra teful tha ~ for 
the purpose of this paper. I shall not need to trespass too far beyond the well­
established and generally accepted core of post-evolutionary synthesis thought. 
6 An additional daim is. of course, implied, namely that Wiener (et al.) erred by 
not reading Pragmatism with Darwin in mind. 
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that affirmed by ecclesiastical authority, and 
(2) that the physical characteristics of the earth were the result 
of natural phenomena, and not supernatural megaphenomena. 
The rejection ofvarious "Vulcanist" and UNeptunian" catastrophic 
theories was made possible chiefly through the efforts of James 
Hutton and Charles Lyell? whose separate efforts combined in time 
for Darwin to have a world which was both old enough and inher­
ently dynamic enough to be the stage for evolution. According to 
uniformitarianism, "processes now seen by humans to operate could 
have operated when humans were not watching." (Ridley, p. 43). 
Uniformitarianism was, among other things, an argument against 
the necessity of supernatural causes. The earthquakes and volca­
noes, storms and mud slides that now occur throughout the world 
have probably always gone on; and given enough time, these forces 
could have molded the present landscape like so much putty. There 
was no need to postulate God's creative hand in shaping the moun­
tains, in carving out the valleys; time and the mundane physical 
forces such as those now known could have given our planet its 
complexion. Darwin betrays his uniformitarianism in Voyage, when 
he relates his experience of witnessing an earthquake while at 
Concepcion: 
A bad earthquake at once destroys our oldest associa­
tions: the earth, the very emblem of solidity, has 
moved beneath our feet like a thin crust over a fluid 
-one second of time has created in the mind a 
strange idea of insecurity, which hours of reflection 
would not have produced. (VB, p. 303).8 
Do we find any evidence that James espoused the uniformitarian 
hypothesis? Yes, though admittedly, trivially so; it would be more 
strange for a man of science such as James to not have accepted 
Lyelliangeology. Be that as it may, there is one passage in "Pragma­
7 My chief source of information about Hutton, Lyell and the birth of historical 
geography has been The DiscovenJ of Time. Consult index for pertinent passages. 
8 I think that it is interesting that Peirce, also a child of the 19th century's 
"evolutionism," wrote: "That single events should be hard and unintelligible, logic 
will permit without difficulty: we do not expect to make the shock of a personally 
experienced earthquake appear natural and reasonable by any account of cogita­
tion" (The Doctrine ofNecessity Examined, 1892). 
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tism and Common Sense" that clearly suggests that James wished to 
remind his audience of the value of unifonnitarian theories as such, 
apart from their well-known application in historical geology: 
New truths are ... resultants of new expeliences and 
of old truths combined and mutually modifying one 
another. And since this is the case ofchanges ofopinions 
oftoday, there is not reason to assume that it has not been 
so at all times (p. 78). 
That is: the habits of mind, the peculiarities of mental life, the way in 
which persons think about the world, has not changed. But why 
should it be important for James to show that the way men and 
women think in 1907 is not different from the way men and women 
thought in 18077 1707? 7077 It is important, as we shall see, because 
James is to play upon the Darwinian theme of descent with modifi­
cation, upon the idea of inheritance. This germ of uniformitarian 
thought, then, may be counted as our first bit of evidence in favor of 
James' use of evolutionary principles in and throughou t Pragmatism. 
The second edge of the anti-catastrophic sword is actualism. 
While uniformitarianism is a statement about the kinds of forces 
(natural, common) which given sufficient time have the power to 
cause great change, actualism is a statement about the magnitude of 
those forces. For example, the uniformitarian hypothesis would 
explain the denudation of the Weald9by the action of the waves; but 
it is the actualist hypothesis that argues against the occurrence of a 
"single diluvian wave." There is no need to invoke forces greater in 
magnitude than those we actually observe; all of the forces of change 
are publicly knowable, and these observable forces are sufficient to 
account for all historical change. On this head Darwin had written: 
as modern geology has almost banished such views 
as the excavation of a great valley by a single diluvial 
wave, so will natural selection, ifitbe a true principle, 
banish the belief of the continued creation of new 
organic beings, or of any great and sudden modifica­
tion in their structure (OS, p. 285). 
9 The Weald is a horseshoe-shaped tract of land on the eastern coast ofEn gland. 
due west of Dover. 
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[The actualist hypothesis having been flushed-out, Darwin later 
fleshes it out:] 
If, then, we knew the rate at which the sea commonly 
wears away a line of cliff of any given height, we 
could measure the time requisite to have denuded the 
Weald. Hence, under ordinary circumstances, I con­
clude that for a cliff 500 feet inheight, a denudation of 
one inch per century for the whole length would be an 
ample allowance (OS, p. 285). 
Statements such as these abound inOrigin, and perhaps it was to one 
such passage that James was referring when he wrote: 
But when we look back, and speculate as to how the 
common-sense categories may have achieved their 
wonderful supremacy, no reason appears why it may 
not have been by a process just like that by which ... 
Darwin let al.] achieved [his] similar triumphs in 
more recent times. In other words, [the common­
sense categories] may have been successfully discov­
ered by prehistoric geniuses ... [the common-sense 
categories] may have been verified by the immediate 
facts of experience which the first fitted; and then 
from fact to fact and from man to man they may have 
spread, until all language rested on them and we are 
notincapable ofthinking naturally inany other terms. 
Such a view would only follow the rule that has 
proved elsewhere so fertile, [namely], of assuming 
the vast and remote to conform to laws of formation 
that we can observe at work in the small and near (P, 
p.83). 
This is as explicit a reference to actualism as one could hope to find 
in any non-geological, non- evolutionary tract-but why would 
James make it? Why would he wish to implant in the minds ofhis 
audience the idea that the magnitude of those forces "that we can 
observe at work in the small and near" would be sufficient to bring 
our brute common sense from a remote age into the present? If we 
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embrace my hypothesis-that James was thinking seriously about 
Darwin and evolution when he articulated his "pragmatism"-then 
the answer is plain. 
As the Weald was made by the sustained, gentle lapping of the 
sea upon the shore, so too has the mind of man been made by the 
sustained attempts of our somewhat hairier forebears to come to 
grips with the rude contingencies of life. The "booming, buzzing" 
world which challenges us every day, confronts us at every tum, is 
the same "world" in which our antecedents were immersed, just as 
it is the same sea which has long nibbled away at the chalk cliffs of 
Dover. The net effect of this ceaseless tide of experience upon the 
human intellect is a brain, a nervous system, a mind peculiarly 
adequated to this "red in tooth and claw" natural world. Not only 
does James here deftly dispatch of any lingering transcendental a 
priori-isms, but he provides a thoroughly naturalistic account of the 
origin of common sense. If this is a fair appraisal of what James was 
really up to, then, we too may concede that James was to some extent 
mindful of the effects of inheritance on the one hand and differential 
fitness on the other. In other words, James would have to have been 
thinking about descent with modification, mitigated by some form of 
(natural?) selection against disutility. 
III. Natural selection 
What would be the features of a genuine evolutionary epistemology? 
Again, if the "epistemology" itself only uses "evolutionary" concepts 
as a model, then we must only be able to analogize epistemological 
concepts into evolutionary ones, and then apply the theory of evolu­
tion-in this case, Darwin's theory-to the epistemological con­
cepts. How convincing the theory of knowledge is will be a function 
of (a) how well the paradigm retains its integrity, and (b) how well 
the paradigm works for the ideas therein treated. That is, an evolu­
tionary epistemology can fail to be either "evolutionary" or much of 
a theory of knowledge if, on the one hand, the model of evolution is 
changed too radically in order to accommodate the epistemologist's 
agenda, or, on the other hand, if there is little payoff from the 
application of the evolutionary model. 
Since Darwin explained evolution by way of the mechanism of 
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natural selection, the most important aspect of any so-called "Dar­
winian epistemology" is the application of this mechanism to episte­
mological constructs (i.e., beliefs, ideas, the relations between these 
and "truth," and the whole host of terms the epistemologist uses), We 
must therefore begin by articulating what "natural selection" means 
to the evolutionary biologist, and Ridley has defined it thus: 
natural selection: Process by which the forms of an 
organism in a population that are best adapted to the 
environment increase in frequency relative to less 
well-adapted forms over a number of generations. 
(Ridley, p. 638), 
In Pragmatism, the beliefs take the place of "forms of an organism," 
and everything else in the definition remains the same. Therefore, the 
position of James for which I am arguing is this: That some of the 
beliefs of individuals are best adapted to the environment of those 
indi viduals, and that as a result of differential fitness of these beliefs, 
their frequency in the population will tend to increase relative to the 
frequency of other beliefs in the population as a whole. 
In order for natural selection (in the biological sense) to work, 
three fadorsmust obtain. Weneed now to present these, and then see 
if our epistemology can be squared with them. They are: . 
(1) characters of organisms must be variable; e.g., no two 
gimffe necks are exactly the same length, at that there is a naturally 
occurring continuum of the length of giraffe necks; 
(2) these characters must be heritable; e.g., the genes/ gene 
complex responsible for the character here defined as "giraffe neck" 
must be able to be passed from parents to offspring; and 
(3) the genotype (genes for characters) musthave the effect of 
differential fitness, when expressed in the phenotype (physical form); 
e.g., the slight differences in length of the giraffe neck must place 
some individuals at an advantage, and others at a disadvantage, 
relative to the frequency of necks of certain lengths in the population. 
Here again we must extrapolate from the ideas of biology to those 
of epistemology; and this is easily enough done. The "characters," 
here, are our beliefs, and these indeed are variable. No two persons 
beli eve exactly the same thing, about the same thing, at the same time; 
and if it were possible to catalog all of the beliefs heldby two persons 
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it is unlikely that we would discover that they have exact! y the same 
beliefs, though many beliefs-both correct and incorrect (e.g., that 
Paris is the capital of France, that a tomato is a vegetable) -would 
indeed be the same. Furthermore, these beliefs are "heritable," in the 
sense that beliefs can be passed from one individual to another. 
Educators and parents, for example, pass on beliefs to their students 
and children, and daily, we are each exchanging and sharing ideas 
with one another.lO Beliefs, then, are "heritable," or at least for our 
purposes, heritable enough. Lastly-and this is the upshot of James' 
lectures-we get different results from the possession of different 
beliefs; those beliefs that do not work for us we jettison, while in 
contrast we may tend to better fasten-down those that do work, and 
which are, due to their utility, more highly valued by us. Experience 
is the crucible, and we will weed out those beliefs that are "unfit." 
It is worthwhile to note that this is a very individualistic truncat­
ing, and that the units of selection are individuals, and not groups; 
this is a point commonly misunderstood about Darwin and his 
scheme for evolution via natural selection, but not apparently by 
James. It just so happens that certain beliefs, like certain "heritable 
characters," will grow in frequency throughout a given population 
because these beliefs happen to have tried-and-true value and do tend 
to be useful to their possessor. For example, James might say that 
most persons profess to believe in God, or to have some theologico­
spiritual commitment as a result of some religious experience. The 
fact that an individual may have such-and-such belief (say, about the 
existence of a Spirit) is not a function of the prevalence of that belief 
in the "belief pool" (like "gene pool") of the population; rather the 
prevalence of the belief among many individuals is an indication of 
the utility and value of the belief of those who have it. This "fitness" 
of (e.g.) spirituality is responsible for its high frequency in the belief 
pool, andifthe belief did not confer some advantage to its possessors, 
its frequency distribution (in individuals and in the population) 
would drop. If the frequency dropped enough the belief would go 
IOPapers published in 1993 in both Scientific AmeriCilu and Americil/! Scientist 
address the issue of "horizontal gene transfer," or, "horizontal drift," which postu­
lates that some parasites (e.g., viruses) are able to transfer genetic material (DNA) 
from one species to another. Thus the "hereditary" aspect of cu I tural, non-biological 
information (per contra the biological information of DNA) seems to have now a 
more sure analogical footing than it did in James' time. 
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"extinct." The analogy between genes and beliefs is a good one; but 
if we are to be justified in attributing the full complement of these 
evolutionary ideas to James, we must turn to what James actually 
had to say; and we will now tum to Pragmatism. 
IV. Pragmatism and Common Sense 
James notes that "the world does genuinely change and grow," 
but that "knowledge grows in spots," and that "knowledge never 
grows all over" (P, p. 77). That knowledge "grows" implies that 
knowledge changes, and James explicitly remarks that the "modifi­
cations [of knowledge] are apt to be gradual" (P, p. 77). Localized, 
gradual change is in many ways the soul of Darwin's theory of 
evolution, and I think it is unlikely that James just happened to 
express his ideas about the dynamics of knowledge in Darwinian 
terms; James was thinking about knowledge in evolutionary terms, 
andthese words suggest a Jamesian version of Natura nonfacit saltum.· 
James tells his audience that "novelties" in thinking are gradually 
introduced to our storehouse of opinions, and then, when the need 
arises, we "modify [the novelties] to some degree" (P. p. 78). This 
activity is not unlike that of the pigeon fanciers, whom Darwin treats 
at length in chapter I of the Origin, titled, Variation under Domestica­
tion. Who could have foreseen that a pigeon fancier would select the 
slight tendency of a pigeon to fall head over heels, and by exploiting 
this queer novelty producing the breed of tumbJers? Or again: Who 
could have foreseen that the natural pausing of some dogs could be 
modified by breeding into the useful trait of "pointing"? These 
novelties were acquired genetically by the organism, and were later 
made use of by the fancier or sportsman. The storehouse of genetic 
informationin organic things is not unlike the storehouse ofinforma­
tion whichminds acquire through time, which, like genetic diversity, 
may someday be marshaled to the front for use. 
Most surprising to me was, perhaps, the discovery of a quote by 
a late 20th century evolutionary biologist which echoes what James 
s,lid to his 1907 audience at the Lowell Institute. While this is not 
evidence in fnvor of] ames' debt to Darwin, Ithink it is evidence that 
. Ed. note: Natura 110/1 fa cit sa/tul/l (na to'tlr'a non fa-sit sal'hm). lntin. nature 
makes no leap. 
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there is something genuinely Darwinian about James' thought on 
epistemological matters. Keeping in mind the achronism, James said 
of the dynamics of knowledge, 
We patch and tinker more than we renew. The nov­
elty soaks in; it stains the ancient mass; but it is also 
tinged with what absorbs it. Our past apperceives 
and cooperates; and in the new equilibrium in which 
each step forward in the process of learning termi­
nates, it happens relatively seldom that the new fact 
is added raw (P, p. 78). 
There is much here that smacks of biological evolution: the close 
interaction between the genotypic milieu and its phenotypic mani­
festation, the acquisition of "novelty," &c. But of chief interest to me 
is the first sentence, which I think all will agree is startlingly similar 
to that of Jacob, who once described the mechanism of evolution 
thus: UNatural selection does not work like an engineer. It works like 
a tinker" (Mayer). My argument for the existence of James' willful 
and intentional comparison between (a) natural selection as the 
means of organic evolution and (b) a broader "evolutionary model" 
of our epistemic kinesis, again, seems to have some foundation. 
The title of the lectures (as published by Longmann) is Pragma­
tism: Or, A New Nmne for SOlne Old Ways OfThillking. But how old is 
"old"? I think we can have a good laugh at the expense of so 
scrupulous an exegete as Wiener (et a1.): by "old," James intended us 
to think of "old" in Lyellian, Darwinian terms, and to think of the 
word ancestraL If this is so, then the exclusion of Pragmatism from the 
literature on early evolutionary epistemological theories is unforgi v­
able. The following is perhaps the best support for James' Darwinian 
agenda: 
It follows that very ancient modes of thought may 
have survived through all the latter changes in men's 
opinions. The most primitive ways of thinking may 
not yet be wholly expunged. Like our five fingers, our 
ear-bones, our rudimentary caudal appendage, our 
other 'vestigial' peculiarities, they may remain as 
indelible tokens in our race-history. Our ancestors 
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may have stuck on a certain way of thinking which 
theyrnight conceivably nothave found. Butonce they 
did so, and after the fact, the inheritance continues ... 
You may rinse and rinse the bottle, but you can't get 
the taste of the medicine or whiskey that first filled it 
wholly out (P, p. 78). 
The following report of some observations should, for my present 
purposes, suffice: 
First: There is the appeal to some ancient time, and to units of 
change (opinions), and to differential survival of those units of 
change. These are the essential ingredients in the evolutionary 
epistemologist's soup. 
Second: The references to both (a) our inability to completely 
"expunge" certain aspects of our thinking. and (b) the vestigiality of 
some characters of thought are most assuredly owed to the swell of 
interest inrudimentary/vestigial organs which-while not new with 
Darwin-was given new importance after 1859. The "five fingers"­
pentadactyly, which is expressed in all mammals (and other taxa)­
is still today one of the best known morphological homologies cited 
in favor of descent with modification. The "ear-bones," like the hand 
bones and jaw bones treated of by Sir Charles Bell (1774-1842) in his 
1833 Bridgewater Treatise The Hand: Its Mechanism and Vital Endow­
ments as Evincing Design, were popular subjects of debate after the 
publication of the Origin, and so the audience likely understood the 
reference as one being to evolutionary explanations.i1 
Third: The references to the"caudal appendage" (clearly playing 
with ideas on human evolution) and to '''vestigial' peculiarities" 
were most assuredly summoned to James' mind from reading chap­
ter 13 of the Origin, particularly the section titled "Rudimentary 
Organs." Of all of Darwin's arguments in favor of evolution via 
descent with modification, his appeal to embryology and to struc­
tural morphology were among the most impressive, and made the 
greatest impreSSion upon men of science of the day. It is not surpris­
ing, therefore, that James would frame his views on the remnants of 
ancient "inherited" beliefs and opinions within the context of vesti­
gial organs, especially if it was James' agenda to articulate an evolu­
11 See Gould, Stephen J. "This View of Life." Natural History. August 1993. 
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tionary epistemology. But without such a reading of James, his 
genius (as seen in the brilliant bottle metaphor) might be under 
esteemed. 
So James at last announces his thesis on page 79: 
My thesis now is this, that our fundamental ways of 
thinking about things are discoveries ofexceedingly remote 
ancestors, which have been able to p1'eserve themselves 
throughout the experience of all subsequent time. [The 
fundamental ways of thinking about things] form one 
great stage of equilibrium in the human mind's de­
velopment, the stage of common sense. Other stages 
have grafted themselves upon this stage, but have 
never succeeded in displacing it. 
And indeed, why should common sense be "displaced"? The fact that 
it hasn't been overthrown, that it hasn't been jettisoned from the 
hold, is testament to its sustained utility in time. Commonsense has high 
fitness. By speaking in such rich detail about the transmission of this 
primordial common sense from our "exceedingly remote ancestors" 
to ourselves, James reveals his commitment to some "epistemic 
principle o.f inheritance," and what's more t his postulation of "other 
stages" of thinking (with which common sense competed) suggests 
variation in the beUefpool over time. Variety? Heredity? Differential 
fitness? ... Evolution. 
The sophistication of James' appreciation oBhe complexities of 
evolution may be judged from the following. One of the biggest 
problems for evolutionary biology to this day is: IIow do we know when 
something is really an "adaptation"? The hypothesis that there will be 
adaptations is one thing. but their discovery, their recognition is 
another. (Darwin was mindful of this, as was he concerned with the 
tangentially related question of how common ancestors can be 
identified given the quite imperfect fossil record). Ridley has written 
on this matter: 
The methods of studying adaptation work well ifwe 
are studying an adaptation. If the character under study 
is an adaptation then it must exist because of natural 
selection and it is correct to persist in looking for the 
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reasonwhyitisfavored ... However,ifa character (or 
different forms of it) is not favored by natural selec­
tion, the method breaks down. Methods of studying 
adaptation should therefore be coniined to characters 
that are adaptive. Probably, in practice, they mainly 
are ... However, there is still plenty of room for 
controversy (Ridley, p. 347). 
If the matter of explaining adaptations is of concern to the evolution­
ary biologist, and if James really was thinking about evolution (and 
was distilling evolution into epistemology), then we should expect to 
find some indication that he too was concerned about adaptive 
explanation. And we do (though for James it is beliefs and knowl­
edge that are the acquired characters, and are thus the objects of 
adaptive change): 
In philosophy, [a man's common sense] means his 
use of certain intellectual forms or categories of 
thought ... It might be, too ... that such categories, 
unimaginable by us today, would have on the whole 
proved serviceable for handling our experiences 
mentally as those which we actually use (P, p. 79). 
James will conclude his remarks on common sense by informing the 
audience that (1) "all our theories are instrumental, are mental modes 
of adaptation to reality," and by suggesting that (2) "Profusion, not 
economy, may after all be reality's key-note" (P, p. 87). 
Regarding (1): Utility and adaptation had their first genuine 
synthesis with the natural historians, who saw the adaptation of 
means to ends in nature (e.g., the hawks eyes) as evidence of the 
magnificence ofthe creator, butitwas Darwin who provided the first 
viable mechanism for a naturally occurring means of such means­
end adequation. I would tend to bet that James was here making 
reference to Darwin, and not to Bell or Paley. 
Regarding (2): I invite the reader to consider whether James was 
addressing the quote popularized by Darwin: "Nature is prodigal in 
variety, niggardly in innovation;" I suggest that James was (OS, p. 
461). 
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V. Conclusion 
All of James' Darwinian-sounding remarks in Pragmatism may 
have some other cause, or they may be merely Darwinian "sound­
ing," but not necessarily intended by James to be "Darwinian" in 
flavor. The list of prominent authors who have maintained that 
Darwin's influence on the ideas ofJames was both (a) limi ted and (b) 
confined chiefly to James' physiological psychology is long, and my 
study of James and the Jamesian corpus is short; I therefore cannot in 
good academic faith say that I have made an airtight case against 
those authors who have not dealt directly with Pragmatism. 
I do, however, hope that reader was "much struck" by the 
siInilarities between Darwinian evolution via descent with modifica­
tionandJames' theory ofknowledge, his "dynamic coherentism" (as 
I have elsewhere called it) as it was presented in the Lowell Institute 
lectures; I also hope that I have taken a small step towards demon­
strating that "mere coincidence" may not be the best explanation for 
this. It is, at any rate, clear to this student that J runes' Pragmatism was 
an attempt to articulate an evolutionary epistemology-and that 
seems to be a possibility that has not been mOl'e rigorously explored 
by scholars of greater ability and resource than myself.* But what­
ever may come from this short study. (to quote Darwin), "It is 
interesting to contemplate an entangled bank," which the Darwin­
James! evolution-epistemology nexus certainly is; and I would be 
pleased to have, in however small a way, enlarged the perspective of 
the reader. 
*Addendum: No study of Darwin'S influence on James would be 
complete ifit did not include a reading of Robert J. Richards' Da/10in 
and the Emergence ofEvolutionary Theories ofMind and Behavior (Chi­
cago, 1987), It is with no small measure of embarrassment that I 
report that I happened upon this work after this paper had been 
submitted. But much to my surprise, (and to my delight!) Roberts­
who cites some 20 works by James, and who treats James at great 
length-does not include Pragmatism in his bibliography. 
I 
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